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Previous research shows that individuals' preferences for the sitting government influence their economic expectations.
1 Whether for psychological reasons or cognitive ones, those who support the government tend to think the future will go well, at least by comparison with those who oppose the government. This is of obvious importance. It reveals that politics clearly structures economics perceptions, and with potentially important consequences, e.g., a change in government can lead to a change in economic expectations. To the extent expectations matter for behavior, it can have effects on the real economy itself. However, implicit in the previous research is an assumption-either that the sitting government will remain in power into the foreseeable future or that voters do not take future political control into account. That is, economic expectations are assumed to be unconditional.
Yet there always is uncertainty surrounding the future control of government. There always is some possibility, however small, that the current leadership will lose control at any particular point in time t+1. It is a structural feature of most parliamentary democracies, where governments actually may be tossed out of power at any point in time. It is less structural, though still a feature of other systems. In all democratic systems, the uncertainty surrounding future control is concentrated in the period prior to elections. Individuals should be expected to take political prospects into account; after all, if the current government can structure the economic future, presumably a future government can too. By implication, economic expectations should be conditional on people's forecasts of the political future itself, at least in the short run. This actually is a commonly-held assumption (Haller and Norpoth, 1994; Carey and Lebo, 2003) . It also is what we would expect were economic expectations rational, which also is commonly assumed. 2 It nevertheless is little-researched. 3 This manuscript examines the conditionality of economic expectations leading up to elections. We first lay out our conjecture and then design a specific test. For the test itself, we use data from five election study panels in the US and UK, focusing on waves both before and after the elections. The analyses show that individuals' pre-election economic expectations are powerfully structured by their political support for the sitting government but that political prospects also matter. Given preferences, those who think their preferred party will win election are significantly more optimistic about the economic future than those who think their preferred party will lose. Post-election expectations do not show any real differences owing to pre-election political prospects, and party preference dominates instead. The pattern of results indicates that economic expectations anticipate election outcomes. That is, they reflect both the political present and future. The finding not only tells us that expectations are substantially rational, but that politics plays a much bigger role than originally thought. The finding also helps us understand empirical patterns that have heretofore eluded explanation, as we will see.
The Politics of Economic Expectations
A lot of research considers the political consequences of economic expectations, some of which was noted above. Lewis-Beck's (1988) statement probably is the strongest and most comprehensive to date. 4 Until fairly recently, however, little attention has been paid to the political causes of these expectations, at least at the individual level. There is of course a long 2 There is a large literature. See, e.g., Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) . For a contrary view, see Krause (2000) . 3 All we know comes from recent studies of stock market prices, which suggest that political uncertainty matters (especially see Leblang and Muhkerjee, 2003; . Although this is a satisfying and important result, it tells us only about investors and only taken together, not people writ large. 4 For a nice review of the broader literature on economics and elections, see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2000) .
tradition of research showing that people's perceptual screens do impact what they see (Campbell, et al., 1960) . Following in this tradition, Conover, Feldman and Knight (1987) reveal that party identification colors people's economic perceptions, and some scholars have explicitly considered the possibility, such as Lewis-Beck (1988) . 5 While this was an important step forward, it still stopped short. That is, controlling for selected political variables, such as ideological disposition, economic expectations were assumed to be otherwise exogenous to politics, a function of retrospective economic evaluations and other things, presumably economic ones.
Recent research shows that this is not true (Anderson, Mendes, and Tverdova, 2004; Evans and Anderson, N.d.; Wlezien, Franklin, and Twiggs, 1997 There are a number of different explanations for this pattern, most of which are "psychological" in nature. The now classic view is from Campbell, et al. (1960) , who posited that people's perceptions of the world are structured by a "perceptual screen" of political preference. From this perspective, people take a favourable view of policies pursued by (or actual outcomes associated with) candidates or parties they support. To the extent that people associate economic performance with the incumbent government, a government they liked (disliked) might be deemed to be performing well (poorly) regardless of real economic conditions. There are other psychological explanations. For instance, following Festinger (1957) , the pattern may be due to people's desire for cognitive consistency. There also is a "cognitive" explanation for the results. That is, it may be that people support the candidates or parties whose policies they prefer. When their preferred politicians are in power, according to this perspective, people become more optimistic about the future because they expect the policies will have a salutary effect. This is what we would expect if voters are Downsian and base their partisan judgments on issues, choosing candidates and parties based on their policy positions. It differs quite markedly with the psychological explanations.
Although we do not know the exact psychological or cognitive underpinnings, we do know that the political present structures people's economic expectations, as we have seen.
But, what about the political future? Do people's economic expectations reflect perceptions of future government control as well, particularly leading up to an election? That is, are their expectations conditional on who they think will win? Certain scholars presume that they are (e.g., Haller and Norpoth, 1994) . In effect, people's economic expectations are assumed to be rational, fully informed by the information they have at hand (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 1997 Until Suzuki (1992) , no research explicitly examined political influences over time. 7 In this research Suzuki showed that politics did matter for expectations over time, and in a provocative way. That is, he provided evidence of an electoral cycle, where economic expectations tend to rise leading up to an election and then peak just thereafter. It was an important finding, particularly given the literature on political business cycles (for a useful review of this literature, see Franzese, 2002) . In one sense, it represented the missing link or 'smoking gun' of sorts. But what Suzuki really created was a puzzle. How do we explain his electoral cycle? It evidently wasn't the real economy, as he controlled for it in his analyses.
7 Indeed, he evidently turned to expectations in his search for a political business cycle precisely because the possibility hadn't been considered.
There also is only mixed evidence for political business cycles in overall economic activity (Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen, 1997) , though we need not take a position in the debate.
Perhaps somehow policymakers have been able to induce an expectation cycle that has little basis in reality, at least one that we haven't yet found. 8 We think that conditionality is another possibility. That is, it may be that economic expectations actually anticipate election outcomes themselves. Consider a scenario where the incumbent is doing poorly and many of us want to change course. Research tells us that we will be pessimistic about the future. At some point, however, we recognize an election on the horizon. This introduces uncertainty about the future. Indeed, it raises the possibility that the incumbent will lose, which should raise economic hopes, on balance. As it becomes clearer that the sitting government will be getting the boot leading up to Election Day, we should tend to become even more optimistic.
Now consider a second scenario, where the incumbent party is doing well and a large proportion of voters support the government. The reasoning here is a bit more subtle, as we will be optimistic about the future to begin with. As the election cycle evolves, the prospect of an election induces uncertainty about future control. Will the incumbent win? Or will the challenger? This presumably will make us less optimistic on average. As it becomes clear leading up to Election Day that the incumbent will remain in office, however, aggregate optimism should rise.
Our conjecture seems to fit quite well with the empirical patterns we observe. We might even wonder: What else would explain the seemingly singular cycle in expectations?
The conjecture also fits well with the literature. We already know that individuals' preferences for the sitting government influence their economic expectations, as we have discussed. We also already know that people make forecasts about future government control and that these are surprisingly accurate in the period preceding elections (Lewis-Beck and Skalaban, 1989; Johnston, Brady, Blais, and Crete, 1992) . Our conjecture simply requires individuals to take both their partisan preferences and political forecasts into account, so that their economic expectations are partly conditional on expectations about the political future. Both current government control and likely future control would matter and their balance of influence would depend on a number of things: (1) the time frame of economic expectations; (2) the point in the election cycle; and (3) the degree of certainty about the election outcome.
First, the time frame of economic expectations is fundamental. Short-run expectations, say, over the next 12 months, cannot be impacted by an election a year or more from now.
Even an election in 9 months may not matter if the winner does not take office for another 2-3 months, as in the US. Indeed, it also may take more time for the government to have a meaningful effect. The point is that the time frame matters and in fairly predictable ways.
(This is of real significance to a portion of our analysis, as we will see.) Second, the point in the electoral cycle is of (related) importance. Well in advance of an election, and putting aside other causes of government termination, expectations about the economic future should be dominated more by current government control than future government control. The logic is simple: when the election is far in the distance, the foreseeable future is mostly in the hands of the present government. Finally, as we approach Election Day, the degree of certainty about the election outcome also is important. Future government control can influence our expectations only to the extent we foresee victory for one party or another. To the extent we are uncertain about the outcome-that we are unsure who will win and lose-our economic expectations can only neatly reflect current government control.
A Specific Analysis
To conduct research on how political expectations leading up to an election structure economic ones, it would be ideal to have a wide variety of data at our disposal. To begin with, we would have individual-level perceptual data on economic expectations and political prospects, each on a regular basis, at short intervals, and for a number of different election years. We also would have aggregate-level objective data for both political and economic conditions, again on a regular basis, at short intervals, and for a number of different election years. The data also would approximately correspond over time. This would allow us to anchor (and cross-validate) changes over time in the subjective and objective data. It is a tall order, however, and one that cannot currently be filled.
The objective data are good, especially as relates to economics. Numerous measures are available and at a variety of levels and on a fairly regular basis. This is well known.
Objective data relating to objective electoral prospects are harder to come by, though the election forecasters offer some information (see, e.g., Campbell and Garand, 2000; Sanders, 1996) and the polls do too (Campbell, 2000) . 9 We also have individual-level perceptual data.
Unfortunately, the existing panel data mostly relate to economics and are available only infrequently and over very short or very long time periods (see also Anderson, et al., 2004) .
The data thus are very limited. We do have regular cross-sections of economic expectations, however. Together with the objective economic and political data, a reasonable aggregate time series analysis may be possible. 9 There are yet other sources, including the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM).
Although this macro approach may have a certain appeal, we focus on individuals over time. For the analysis, we rely on a set of two-wave panels, those where surveys are conducted both before and after elections. Specifically, we use data from five recent national election studies in the US and UK: Three from the American National Election Studies ( The BES actually conducted additional pre-election waves as part of its 1992-1997 survey, but unfortunately did not include the item asking about who will form the next government, which is critical to our analysis. Thus, our examination focuses primarily on how individual-level political preferences, electoral prospects, and economic expectations interrelate in the one-wave pre-election survey in each year. These data clearly cannot give us a complete picture of the interrelationships between economic and political change. However, we can determine the structure relating individuals' subjective forecasts of the outcome of an upcoming election,
given preferences, and their economic expectations. We also can draw comparison with the structure of expectations using data from the post-election waves of the panels. That is, we can compare the pre-election structure, in the context of electoral uncertainty, with the post-election structure, where there is no electoral uncertainty. It allows us to determine whether any evident conditionality prior to elections is spurious, the result of some other variable that is present both before and after elections. We thus can settle things empirically.
Competing Models of Economic Expectations
How do we expect partisan preferences, electoral prospects and economic expectations to interrelate? Let us consider the possibilities, for the moment putting aside the traditional "economic voting" model. The first possibility is that expectations only reflect preferences for current party control. This reflects the current literature, as discussed above. Its implications are also straightforward. If it is the right model, people's economic expectations would depend only on their preferences for the sitting government. Those who prefer the government would be optimistic and those who oppose it would be relatively pessimistic. These expectations would be unconditional. They would not depend on political expectations about the outcome of elections or other political events. The empirical implications are summarized in the first column of Table 1 . Here, expectations are high whenever the government is preferred and low whenever the government is not preferred.
The pattern in column 1 is exactly what we would predict if economic expectations cause partisan preferences. According to this prospective "economic voting" model (LewisBeck, 1988) , those who are think the future economy looks bright would vote for the incumbent party, while those who think the future looks dim would vote for a challenger.
Thus, the causal direction relating economic expectations and current party control is not obvious, and cannot be sorted cross-sectionally. We can to some extent sort between the two explanations over time, however, as Anderson et al. (2004) Yet another possibility is that expectations reflect both preferences for the sitting government and prospects for future control. This might seem a very understandable combination. If this "combined" model is right, those who prefer the incumbent party and expect it to win would be the most optimistic about the future. Likewise, those who do not prefer the incumbent party but expect the party to win would be the most pessimistic. In the other two categories, expectations should be middling. Their order would depend on the relative impact of current party and future party control. If current party matters more, then those who prefer the incumbent party but do not expect the party to win would be more optimistic. If the future party matters more, then those who do not prefer the incumbent party and think it will not win reelection would be more optimistic. If both current and future party matter equally, expectations in the two categories would be indistinguishable. These implications are summarized in the third column of Table 1 . Notice that the orderings of the different models are distinct, at least in theory. Now, let us see how things work in practice.
The Data
In every national election year, studies are conducted in the UK and US that ask questions of a sample of citizens both before and after the election. Here, we use the set of these two-wave panel surveys conducted in the US in 1992, 1996, and 2000 and in the UK in 1997 and 2001. The UK surveys actually were part of longer-running panels conducted from 1992-1997 and 1997-2001, respectively . The studies differ in numerous other ways, both across countries and across surveys within countries. The US relies more exclusively on a face-to-face mode, spends longer in the field both before and after elections, and asks a more intense battery of questions. The relevant ones also will be made clear as the analyses unfold.
Of course, there are other differences, and some of these are of special importance. For instance, the pre-election wave of the 1997 panel actually was conducted in the autumn (between 10 October and 12 December) before the election of 1 May. This constrains our analyses in that year, as we will see. Most important, however, are the similarities. Sample sizes all are above 1100 and panel attrition between waves is small, no more than 22 percent in any given year and approximately 15 percent on average. Now let us review the variables for analysis, which are summarized in Table 2 .
Economic Expectations (and Retrospections)
Our primary dependent variable is the measure of national economic expectations.
While it may be that personal expectations are most important for political evaluations (Sanders, 1996) , we are interested here in how government control tutors expectations relating to the national economy. A question tapping these evaluations is asked in each pre-election wave of the five surveys, and the question is always placed directly after the retrospective national economic evaluation. The question wording for each of these items does differ across countries and elections, however. Consider first the retrospective question. In the 1997 UK survey, respondents were asked: "Looking back over the past year or so, would you say that Britain's economy has got stronger, got weaker, or stayed the same?" They then were asked:
(If stronger or weaker) "By a little or a lot?" The same question was used in the 1997 postelection survey. The wording was changed a bit for 2001. Then respondents were asked:
"How do you think the general economic situation in this country has changed in the last 12 months?" The respondent was shown a card that listed five categories from "Got a lot worse"
to "Got a lot better." The question was not then asked in the 2001 post-election wave. This is of little consequence for our analysis, which requires a measure of post-election economic expectations.
In the US, things are similar. A retrospective national economic question is asked in each pre-election survey but not in each post-election survey. 12 The question wording does differ, however. In 1992, respondents were asked: "Compared to four years ago, would you say that the nation's economy is better, worse, or about the same?" Respondents were not asked about degree, i.e., "a lot better" or "a little better." The questions used in the 1996 and 2000 surveys were more different still, but also more like what was used in the UK. In 1996, respondents were asked: "Now, thinking about the economy in the country as a whole, would you say that over the past year the economy has gotten better, worse, or stayed about the same?" In both years, follow-up questions probed the degree of better and worse.
The practice with expectations is largely parallel. In the 1997 survey in the UK, respondents were asked: "Looking forward to the year ahead, do you think Britain's economy 12 It is asked in both waves only in 1996.
will get stronger, weaker, or stay about the same?" They then were asked about "a little" or "a lot." The same question was asked in the 1997 post-election survey. As with retrospections, the question was changed a bit for 2001. Respondents were asked: "How do you think the general economic situation in this country will develop in the next 12 months?" and then shown a card that listed five categories from "Got a lot worse" to "Got a lot better." Importantly, the prospective question was asked in both the 2001 pre-election and post-election waves.
-- Table 2 Recall that respondents were not asked to differentiate the degree of "better" and "worse." For that year, we create three-point variables where the value 1.5 indicates "worse," 3 "about the same," and 4.5 "better." This coding makes mean economic perceptions more comparable across elections.
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Partisan Preference
Of fundamental importance to our analysis is political preference. We want to know which party or candidate an individual wants to see win. The measures of partisan preference are fairly straightforward, and rely on questions that ask how the respondents will vote in the upcoming election. The wording differs a bit across countries and also elections, but is strikingly similar with the exception of the pre-election wave for the UK in 1997, which was conducted 6-8 months in advance (see the discussion above). The question used in that year is very much like the standard "trial heat" items used to gauge electoral preferences over the 14 Using a 1-3-5 coding scheme would only expand the variance and, typically, shift the mean away from 3.0.
election cycle: "If there was a general election tomorrow, which political party do you think you would be most likely to support?" In the 2001 pre-election wave, which was conducted over the 30 days leading up to the election, respondents were asked: "Which party do you think you are most likely to vote for?" In neither year were respondents asked about the intensity of their support, that is, whether support is "strong" or "weak."
In the US, the pre-election waves all were conducted over the 63 days preceding Election Day and the question wording is the same in each year. Respondents were asked:
"Who do you think you will vote for in the election for president?" After answering, they then were asked: "Would you say your preference is strong or not strong?" Thus, we have ordinal measures of preferences for president in the US, and these are used at certain points in the analysis that follows. For the most part, however, the analyses rely on standard dichotomous measures of party and candidate preference, e.g., the Labour Preferred variable takes the value "1" for those who say they will vote for the Labour Party and "0" otherwise.
Electoral Prospects
Also fundamental to our analysis are subjective electoral prospects. We need measures of these assessments and, fortunately, we have these for each of the pre-election waves in the five years. There are only slight differences in question wording. For 1997 in the UK, respondents were asked: "Which party do you think will form the government after the next general election?" In 2001, they were asked: "Which party do you think is most likely to win in the country as a whole?" In neither year were respondents asked about the likely size of the expected victory. In the US, the question is the same in each pre-election survey: "Who do you think will be elected president in November?" In each year, respondents also were asked: "Do you think the presidential race will be close or will [name given] win by a lot?" 15 Like for preferences, then, we have ordinal measures of electoral prospects in the US, which are used to probe certain analyses. We still rely mostly on standard dichotomous measures.
An Analysis of Economic Expectations Partisan Preferences and Economic Expectations
As we have discussed, a good amount of literature shows that economic perceptions reflect political preferences. Supporters of the incumbent party tend to be much more satisfied than opponents of the incumbent party about both the economic past and future. The pattern also is clear in our data (see Appendix A). More interesting for our purposes are responses to a question from the BES that specifically asks people about the conditionality of their economic expectations, that is, assuming different electoral outcomes. In the spring, 1996 wave of the 1992-1997 panel, respondents were asked: "Supposing the Conservative Party won the next general election. Do you think that Britain's economy would get stronger, get weaker, or stay about the same?" Respondents who replied with "stronger" or "weaker" were asked: "By a lot or a little." The same questions were asked about the Labour Party. The results are displayed in Table 3 .
-- Table 3 about here --In 
Partisan Preferences and Electoral Prospects
A good amount of research shows that subjective estimates of electoral prospects reflect political preferences (Granberg and Brent, 1983; Granberg and Holmberg, 1986; Granberg and Brown, 1989; Johnston, Brady, Blais, and Crete, 1992; Dolan and Holbrook, 2001 ). Supporters of a particular party are more likely than opponents of the party to think that the party is going to win. This tendency presumably has psychological roots and reflects the degree to which people care, following Festinger (1957) . 16 However, we also have learned that electoral prospects have cognitive roots and partly reflect electoral realities (see, e.g., Lewis-Beck and Skalaban, 1989; Johnston, Brady, Blais, and Crete, 1992 ; also see Bartels, 1988) . The more lopsided an election, the smaller the difference in subjective electoral prospects. At some point reality at least partly overwhelms the expression of our hopes and cares. Both of these tendencies are evident in our data. This is clear in Table 4 , which shows the results of logistic regression analyses for each election year.
The dependent variable in the Table is dichotomous subjective electoral prospects, where an expected incumbent party win equals 1. The independent variables include three dichotomous preference variables, which capture support for the incumbent party, the second major party, and the third party candidates, respectively. The crucial independent variable is a linear trend variable that taps the date on which a respondent was surveyed. This follows Lewis-Beck and Skalaban (1989) . Recall that in each of the three US elections respondents were interviewed over the 63 days leading up to Election Day. In the UK, the practice differed somewhat. As noted earlier, our pre-election wave for 1997 actually was conducted in the autumn of 1996, some 6-8 months in advance of the election. The date of interview during this period does not offer insight into learning as the election cycle draws to a close, and so we do For this analysis, we estimate statistical models of individual-level expectations and explicitly test the order of coefficients, following Table 1 . There we outlined three competing models, one where expectations only reflect current government control, another where expectations only reflect future party control, and yet another where both current and future control matter. If only current party control matters, those who prefer the sitting government would be more optimistic than others about the economic future, regardless of electoral prospects. If only future control matters, we would observe that those who think their preferred party will win the upcoming election are more optimistic than those who think their preferred party will lose, regardless of current party control. If both current and future control matter, those who prefer the incumbent party and expect it to win would be the most optimistic about the future and those who do not prefer the incumbent party but expect the party to win would be the most pessimistic. In the other two categories, expectations should be middling and their exact order would depend on the relative impact of current and future party control.
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Our dependent variable is the five-point measure of pre-election economic expectations.
Our independent variables capture different combinations of electoral preferences and prospects: (1) incumbent party victory expected and preferred; (2) incumbent party victory preferred and not expected; (3) 2 nd party victory preferred and expected; and (4) 2 nd party victory preferred and not expected. For third parties, it is not possible to estimate the interdependent effects of preferences and prospects, as the numbers of supporters expecting their party to win is just too small in each of the five election years. We do include a measure of third-party preference, however. The basic model is estimated using ordered logit. 18 The results of estimating the basic models of pre-election expectations for each of the five years are 17 It also may be that expectations reflect combinations of electoral preferences and prospects, but that these combinations merely indicate different degrees of preference for the sitting government. The possibility effectively extends the "current party" model (see Table 1 ), building on the empirical analysis of electoral prospects, in which political preferences were shown to play a powerful role. According to this possibility, electoral prospects indicate intensity of expressed political preferences. Thus, while those who prefer the sitting government are expected to be optimistic about the future economy, those who also think the incumbent party will win should be most optimistic of all. Likewise, those who do not prefer the sitting government would be pessimistic, and those who think it will lose would be most pessimistic of all. The ordering for this model is straightforward and distinct from the three described in Table 1 -the implied ordering using the categories in the Table, from top to bottom are: high, low-middle, high-middle, and low. There is little empirical support for this possibility, however, as we will see. 18 We are not entirely convinced of its appropriateness in this case, as we think that underlying economic expectations are continuous. In any event, the results are substantively the same using ordinary least squares.
shown in Table 5a . Results of analysis including pre-election retrospections and various demographic variables are essentially the same.
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-- Tables 5 about here That is, the coefficients among both incumbent party supporters and incumbent party opponents differ according to subjective forecasts of the outcome. Among supporters, those who think the incumbent party will win are significantly (p<.05) more optimistic about the future economy than those who think the incumbent party will lose. The same is true for opponents. 20 This is strong evidence of conditionality. The four coefficients can be clearly ordered, as shown in the first column of Table 5b . The order is exactly as we would predict if economic expectations reflect both current and future party control, and where current control is more dominant.
Much the same is true in the other years. This can be seen in the 2 nd -5 th columns of Table 5b . The order of the coefficients is as we would predict for the party-conditional model in each year but for 1997 in the UK. In that year, economic expectations are not conditional.
That is, current party control matters and future control does not, at least not reliably. The . This is evident in Table 5b , which indicates both the ranking of coefficients and their relative significance.
-- Tables 6 about here there is uncertainty about the electoral future, economic expectations reflect both current and likely future party control; after elections, where there is little electoral uncertainty, economic expectations only reflect current control.
Discussion and Conclusion
Much research addresses the rationality of economic expectations. 24 Do they reflect information about the future? What kinds of information are important? How does politics figure in? While these are big questions, the goal of our research here has been comparatively modest: To assess the effects of political uncertainty relating specifically to upcoming 23 The one exception is for those who did not prefer the incumbent party in the 1992 US election. Those who prior to the election thought the incumbent party would lose were significantly more optimistic about the economy after the election than those who thought the incumbent party would win. 24 Especially see Krause (2000) . Also see Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997 Even where there are majorities, the amplitude of the cycle should depend on the size of the victory, though not necessarily in straightforward ways. Larger majorities should predict strong cycles when the majority forms against the incumbent. As it becomes clear that the incumbent will get the boot, a previously very pessimistic public will become more optimistic on balance. Large majorities should matter less consistently when the majority forms in favour of the incumbent. We are quite likely to observe a cycle when a majority emerges late and/or grows leading up to Election Day. Here, an increasingly supportive and certain electorate becomes more and more optimistic on balance. When a large majority in support of the incumbent is in place early, however, we should observe relatively little growth in economic expectations leading up to Election Day. That is, expectations would be optimistic to begin with and remain so until the foregone reelection landslide occurs. The research thus not only accounts for the extant evidence of cycles in economic expectations, it predicts differences across electoral contexts. These differences, of course, can be assessed directly.
The general model does not apply only to elections. That is, it generalizes across all knowable sources of uncertainty about future government control. As noted at the very beginning of the paper, there always is some possibility that the current leadership will lose control at any particular point in time t+1. It is a structural feature of most parliamentary democracies, where governments actually may be tossed out of power at any point in time. It is less structural, though still possible, in other systems. The point is that voters may take this uncertainty into account. This may be particularly true when there is a nontrivial possibility of losing control, owing to a vote of no confidence, scandal, or even strategic election timing itself (Smith, 2003) . The possibilities can be directly tested.
The implications of the research may run deeper still. It may be, after all, that the objective economy itself is endogenous to preferences and elections. To the extent expectations structure behaviour, the electoral cycle in economic expectations may have real economic consequences (Matsusaka and Sbordone, 1995) . Disentangling such an effect requires a lot more work, of course. For now, we can conclude that the effects of politics are only on the perceptual. These effects, as have seen, are very real. Bush Supporters Nader Supporters
